

Some Notes for a Theory of Emotion

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It has been said that man cannot become fully cognisant of any experience until he has given to that experience a name. The reverse is also unfortunately true, Names exert a curious hypnotic effect upon the mind, forcing thought into accepted paths and blocking the road to fresh thinking.

Nowhere is this more true than in the study of emotion. Part of the difficulty workers in this field experience is the coruscation of terminology that has surrounded it. Emotion cannot be directly touched, it can only be seen in its effects. It is even difficult to introspect accurately about emotion because few minds can call emotion into being at will. All that can be done is imaginatively to call up situations capable of arousing an emotion, and from there read backwards from the effect to the cause.

Difficulties next arise concerning the name to give to that observed. Shall we term it affect? feeling? sensation? Or shall we posit existence of 'instinct' and link up our observations to that hypothesis? It is as impossible to demonstrate in man the existence of instinct if the term be used in the usual sense, as to make direct contact with the actual stuff of emotion.

This difficulty and the problems that are associated with it are matters of academic interest to the university psychologists but to the psychotherapist they are of central importance. Psychotherapy is concerned with the affective processes in man, and problems connected with emotion are the material in which it works. The psychotherapist is faced, not with problems concerning the theoretic nature of emotion as such, but with the study of currents of emotion which have become pathological. He is concerned not with the definition of emotion, but with the reorientation of definite emotional trends in a definite patient.

Cannon and Crile, many years ago, and Wittkower recently, have been able to produce in given individuals objective laboratory evidence connecting emotion, showing there is an intimate connection between certain states of feeling and the intimate working of certain organs. Recent work from the fields of psychiatric surgery has advanced our knowledge considerably concerning the relation of emotion and control of emotion to selected brain areas.

We still remain, however, faced with the same fundamental difficulty: how is a study of emotion to be conducted? Let me put the problem this way:- an infant breaks into screams, a child smashes a toy: we can observe both accurately. It would be possible with wireless recording and camera to reproduce the actual happening. Having done this – what next? How are we to deal with this piece of evidence? If we give it a name, rage? anger? fear? spite? We have already prejudged the conclusion. We can no longer enquire into the nature of rage or spite, because we have already labelled this phenomenon as an example of one or the other, and can, from now on, only classify it with other examples. If we do not do so, on the other hand, in what way can we deal with it? Dr. Wittkower states, “I suggested to my subjects, fear, disappointment, joy”. – But how can he be sure that this is so? To say to one person, ‘You have won the Calcutta Sweep’, might mean acute misery, not joy: is there any means by which we can be sure of the nature of the emotion produced? All that can be said is that something of an emotional nature occurred which was associated with the physiological phenomena which followed.

In the case of children the situation is far more difficult: there is no means whatever of making direct contact with a child’s interior experience; if the effort begin with the child. Psycho-analysis, the one school of thought who attempt an account of the nature of infantile emotional experience, is enabled to do so by its experience, not originally of a child but derivatively to children from previous experience of adults.

Yet in any study of children, and particularly of children exhibiting pathological emotional states, the question of the nature of emotion is of fundamental importance. Here any theory, so long as it offers a line of action, is of value, as without a theory no work can be begun.

It is the purpose of this paper to set out a theory of the nature of emotion which has been used as a groundwork for a psychotherapeutic approach to the problems of children for now some eight years and which has afforded practical working value.

The basis upon which this work has been constructed is an endeavour to observe the children referred to it, freshly, and without previous adoption of any theory; then firstly to devise instruments of play for the children which will enable them to adequately express

their interior difficulties, and secondly to create means of record of the actions of the children which will enable such to be studied and evaluated apart from the children themselves.

It is from a study of these evidences that the following tentative hypotheses are put forward.

Firstly concerning the nature of emotion itself.

Let us consider the tendencies existent in a fertilised ovum as it begins to divide. We know that there exists in the nucleus of this cell, incredible as it actually is, a complete teleological pattern of the ultimate physical structure. As Julian Huxley has shown in the case of several types of [experiments], while outer circumstances can affect the size and vigour of the ultimate organism, nothing except damage to embryonic tissue can affect the form of the final organism. It seems queer that the number of cells in the pancreas, or islets of Langerhaus in the ultimate intestine should already exist potentially in the original chromosomes: yet we have to accept the fact that this so. We have to take it that the ground plan of the ultimate physical structure is laid down in the primary nucleus and also its average rate of development. The whole science of nutrition is based upon figures taken over immense averages of the expected physical manifestation to be reached by this segmenting ovum at fixed dates after the first division. Rate of development in the human is not absolute and is far less regular than in the lower animals, but is regular enough to permit of scientific use, and the creation of charts of average development.

We have, therefore, in relation to the physical structure of the body both a ground plan and a time scale which we must presume as in some way predetermined in the fertilised ovum.

The functioning of these structural cells follows something the same plan. As is now well known, the endocrine structures of the body come into functional activity in a progressive series and the same is true of the central nervous system. Once again, tests of normality can be based upon the average rate of development and neurological diagnoses follow these findings.

The physiological functions of a certain part of this organism we know as intelligence, and here again a structure can be demonstrated. The conception of the mental age of a child as distinct from his chronological age is based upon the discovery, first pointed out by Binet in 1904, that certain definite pieces of intellectual work can be performed at a certain age and not earlier. The whole of educational practice is based upon the assumption that minds develop in a predictable and orderly fashion, and that it is possible to make out schemes of work before-hand, which it is assumed that children of a certain age will be able to carry out.

The time factor in this case and the integration of the various elements of which intellect is composed, is of very much looser weave than is operative in physical development, yet the pattern is there, and upon its validity the possibility of educational systems depend.

We have now considered the physical structure of the child, its physiology, and that part of its physiology which is specialised into the working of intelligence. It is clear that there exists another important element of the whole personality; that which gives it direction and drive. When the adult is considered, this element of the personality has become so complex, so split up into multitudinous separate, interwoven and interacting strands, that investigation is a matter of great difficulty. In children, however, the situation is much simpler, and here it becomes possible to put forward a tentative working hypothesis.

Let me try to express this as follows:-

Movement, whether chemical or physical, is the characteristic of life, and very particularly of early life. Movement is expressed the urge towards physical growth and in the striving of the intellect.

It seems to me valuable to posit something similar of the affective, instinctual, emotional life, and to refuse to attempt to separate this into affect, instinct or emotion until there is unmistakable evidence that some division of the kind is necessary.

If this be granted, we should expect the development of this force to follow the same general pattern as that of the others, that is, the physical, psychological and the intellectual elements of the total organism. As the time factor and also the theological pattern is on a

looser weave than in the intellectual element than the physical, so we would expect the time factor in the development of this third aspect to be looser than that of the intellectual; and the final end pattern to admit of far greater variation; but both elements time and pattern still to be present.

According to this hypothesis there would be contained in the original nucleus not only an impulse towards the development of physical and intellectual energy, but also towards that of emotional energy, and also this the point I wish to make, that this energy would have a ground of development as have the other elements. As with the physical and intellectual impulses the ground plan of development of this third impulse should in all individuals be roughly similar, and the rate of development proportionately the same.

Now we are accustomed to think of a total of Emotion in the human being as being split up into elements terms the emotions, love, hate, jealousy, fear, anger, etc. We are accustomed further to a linking of these again with instincts. This may be called a vertical splitting of the total emotional forces.

We are accustomed, moreover, to thinking of these emotions as identifiable entities, recognisable by their effect on the individual feeling them, and in the expression to which he gives them, remaining unchanged. We further generally assume that being recognisable entities they are permanent, persisting and inalienable parts of a human personality, so that anger or spite at 6 and at 60 are the same emotions.

I wish to suggest the possibility of a different hypothesis. That the emotional content of subject A is analogous to that of subject B, as in the current hypothesis, but if we allow ourselves the symbol that growth be thought of as moving along a horizontal line or that this similarity is horizontal rather than vertical as suggested above, and essentially involves the idea of change of form. It would follow, therefore, that the nature of any part of this force at 60 is not and cannot be the same as it was at 6.

That is to say, I would postulate a force, analogous to that of the intellect, found in all human beings, and capable of being analysed into component parts. This force is present at birth and develops with growth, altering its form and nature with the changes it passes through, as do mind and body. Moreover that it is impossible, once a forward step has been

taken by any of the strands composing this total element, for it to go back again; just as the human body cannot once again return to its mother's womb.

Now in order to make this hypothesis comprehensible, let us begin by considering the nature of emotion in childhood and consider certain differences between emotion as it is felt by a child and emotion as felt by an adult human being.

Let us make a mental image of the behaviour of a normal eighteen months old baby and then imagine this form of feeling and behaviour transported unchanged into the body of a full-grown man. What should we find? A being who insisted all the time upon obtaining immediate satisfaction of desire. Who would lie on the ground and kick and scream if his wants were ignored. Who would have no respect for authority or for anyone's interests but his own, and who would work with utter ruthlessness for his own ends. Such conduct is amusing in the body of an eighteen months old child, his small size and lack of skill render his efforts at omnipotence endearing; at thirty-five they would be regarded as the conduct of a criminal lunatic and the man himself be put under forcible restraint by society as an antisocial force. Not, mark you, because the actions were in themselves, i.e., in the baby, abnormal or wrong, but because while right and normal in an infant their persistence to adult life was a sure indication that certain changes in the nature of emotion and the reaction of the total organism to emotion, upon the occurrence of which we usually reckon, had not taken place.

It is clear then, that in the passage from infancy to adult life something has to happen to children if the usual phenomena we are accustomed to finding in civilised races are to appear. If we are to take Lo Bagola as correct, the process is different for primitive people.

If this hypothesis be granted so far, two questions present themselves: Of what nature is this emotional force and how does it show itself? – and what is this process that it goes through in passage from infancy to maturity?

It is impossible in the space of a single paper to answer adequately both these questions, but certain things can be said to each.

1. The essential nature of this force seems to be a drive towards the acquisition of experience of experience.
2. There are different elements in this force which are each capable of independent development, and growth (that is of differentiation) along one line does not necessarily imply growth along another.

Let us take point 1 first.

I cannot at present be sure that 'love' or 'hate' are primary forces. There seems to me at present to be no evidence to show that this is the case. Such evidence as we have seems to suggest that complex important elements of emotional life are secondary and built out of simpler primary elements. But the desire to experience is certainly primary and is the motive force which drives the infant to development. He wishes to 'know', (in the sense that knowledge is used in the bible for intimate sensual experience of another person) his world. He moves out to mix himself with it and it with him. These processes are called in psycho-analytic terminology projection and introjection; but the use of these terms does not greatly assist understanding of the process. The process is at base a mystical one. Its highest expression lies in the mystical experience of the adepts of all religions. (It is awkward to have to use the word religion here, for there is no emotional factor in the 'unity' achieved by the yogi and an immense emotional element in that of the Christian: but there is at present no other convenient phrase.) Its lowest is found in the infant sucking the brass knob of his bed, and attempting to smear his own faeces on the same bed; or, if you will, sucking the nipple of his mother and giving out to her at the same time his own urine.

Since the first impulse of the infant is towards direct experience, for this purpose all his senses are used. It is agreed that the winning of this experience produces in him pleasure and unpleasure, and that this is the cornerstone of the edifice of psycho-analytic theory. I would submit, however, that here the word 'pleasure' is accepted too uncritically, and would suggest that we here consider the experience 'pleasure' in some detail.

I wish to put forward that there is not one relatively simple emotional experience, termable 'pleasure', but that this experience is divisible into two parts, and moreover that the characteristics of the one are the antithesis of characteristics of the other. I am accustomed

in thinking of these two halves to call the one A. pleasures, and the other B. pleasures. In this way the name given to the grouping does not in any way prejudge the nature of the group itself. Let us consider each in turn.

A. pleasures are pleasures of receptivity. The child's primary pleasures are receptive; they are reactions to outside stimuli, and this type of pleasure persists through life. A. pleasures are essentially simple in nature: they may be extremely varied in type, refined and delicate, but the actual sensation aroused is a simple one. That is to say, it is the exercise of one or at most two senses; it is heard, seen felt, tasted, or experienced in a direct and simple fashion. However great the refinement of the type of stimulus that is offered, the reaction remains a simple sensuous reaction. Unavoidably and inevitable at some point repetition of this type of pleasure leads to satiation. Each individual is able to imbibe a certain amount of pleasure in a given activity, and beyond this point in repetition of the activity the organism ceases to experience enjoyment. This is satiation.

All down the ages at every period of elegance and culture, it has been proved impossible for human beings to continue passive receptivity to any experience for longer than a certain time. To produce the same effect the stimulus must be continually strengthened and varied in ever-increasing degrees; and even then the individual is forced, comparatively soon, to seek new and more eccentric forms of that type of stimulus. The stimulus in itself eventually ceases altogether to be effective. To sum up, therefore, this type of pleasure is simple, receptive and limited, and the limitation varies with the individual.

Another very important feature of this kind of pleasure is that it has no relation to the deeper layers of the personality. It is this lack of relationship between the receptive experience and the deeper layers of the mind which produces the effect of satiation. The fact that these experiences do not touch at any point the deeper and more permanent layers of the psyche is in itself the ground why the individual has so limited a capacity for continuing to enjoy them. Enjoyment of them to excess leaves too large a part of his total personality unexercised.

The pleasures of Group B. are in every way different from the pleasures of group A. They are the pleasures of effort and chronologically develop slightly later than A. pleasures. In the

first place, B. pleasures are essentially complex, as against A. pleasures which are primarily simple. The pleasure-producing type of activity in this form of pleasure is always a combination of a number of forces existing in the individual. Individuals about to experience pleasures of the type of B., are those who set out to do something, to exercise their functions and their faculties, and who find in that exercise a pleasure which is to them more satisfying than the pleasures in Group A.

Group B. pleasures have certain standard characteristics. They represent the impact of the individual upon the external world, and bring about in consequence a definite and often permanent modification of the external world. For instance – an individual embroiders a set of table-mats for her aunt, or works in a garden, or does some incredibly foolish piece of needlework, and yet efforts of as little value as this are all done with some purpose behind them, some illusory idea that the aunt dislikes her plain table and would like to change it by putting the mats upon it, or that the garden plot would look better with flowers instead of weeds. In every case the environment is in so great a degree altered. The activity has been undertaken, not for its receptive effect upon the self, but in relation to something or someone outside the self's own personality.

It is not in any way necessary that Group B. pleasures are of a "higher" type than Group A. pleasures. It is possible for B. pleasures in themselves to be singularly vile, as in the pleasures of sadism, but it remains that pleasures of this type bring about alteration in environment. From this it follows that the first element in Group B. pleasures is a sense of power over the environment. However small, fragmentary or illusory it be, this sense of power is an inalienable element in all B. pleasures and has no relation to the value or the skill, the success or the failure, the beauty or the ugliness of the effect the individual brings to pass.

The second fundamental element in Group B. pleasures lies in the fact that there is in them a particle of eternity. Every individual is burdened with a sense of the fleetingness of himself and of time; with the sense that his words, his actions and his failings all pass away and leave nothing behind. There are few things so intolerable to the human mind as the feeling that it itself is as nothing, a thing of no weight, and of no importance. The completion, therefore, of the smallest piece of work – the mats for one's aunt, or the ship for one's son

– produces in the maker a feeling of having defeated this impermanence; something has been created that will remain, even if this permanence is transitory.

That being so, this type of activity has a relation to two of the most profound elements in the whole of the human psyche.

The human psyche is perpetually beset by two irresistible and unquenchable pains – firstly the pain of inadequacy, felt far more acutely in modern times than if we had lived in earlier and simpler days. Today we feel crushed under in a world we cannot influence, subject to catastrophes we do not desire and cannot alter. Secondly the human being has from the moment it passes through the very earliest stages of its life, that feeling of the impermanence of itself, its friends, family, its nation, art, and school – the feeling that these may pass away and nothing remain.

Thus while the pleasures of Group B. assuage some of the deeper human needs, the pleasures of Group A. have no such relation and are entirely absorbed in the personality as it is at the moment of the experience of them. Persons whose lives are mostly influenced by A. pleasures tend therefore to age early, to lose the pristine energy with which they started on their type of career, to become blasé and tired, and to sink quickly under the attacks of adverse circumstances. Whereas, the B. pleasures ricochet back upon the total personality, assuaging some of its deepest aches, and gaining new life and new vigour therefrom. People whose lives are mainly occupied with pleasures of this type seem to draw from some strange hidden source springs of energy that carry them over mountains of labour without apparently damage to their machinery. Yet this also has its disadvantages.

The following is a table of comparison of the two types of pleasures:

A. pleasures	B. pleasures
Simple, the exercise of one or two sensations.	Complex. A combination of a number of forces in the individual.
Passive and receptive.	Outgoing, an exercise of function.
Reaction to external stimuli.	Product of internal stimuli.

Leads to changes in physical self, leaving external world untouched.	Leads to emotional and intellectual changes, and brings about changes in external world.
Limited.	Unlimited.
Demands stronger stimuli progressively.	Demands less external stimulus.
Leads to satiation	Leads to repetition.
Increases dissociation between sense and intellect.	Integrates sense and cognition
Has no relation to the deeper layers of the personality.	Assuages some of the deeper human needs.

Without an acceptance of the existence of these two elements and their differentiation it seems to me impossible to understand the processes of emotional growth because it is through the interaction of these two lines of experience that development takes places. Both types of pleasure play an important part in the development of any individual.

Let us consider now the mode of development of each form of pleasure.

A. pleasures

Study of children during the process of growth leads me to a suggestion that the process of development of A. pleasure follows something resembling the following route.

STAGE I

Part I Memory of a previous A. pleasure leads to expectation of its renewal. (It is possible that prenatal experience is the original A. pleasure experience leading after birth to an expectation of the renewal of this experience, and Dr. Jane Suttie's recent thesis is suggestive in this connection).

Part II Movement towards the possibility of renewal.

Part III Fresh realisation of A. pleasure.

Part IV Repetition of the performance producing this pleasure until all the newness is worn off: i.e. to saturation point as far as this particular experience is concerned.

Stage II

Relinquishment of the process producing this pleasure and a looking around for a new variant.

Experience of satisfaction in one direction tends to make the child expect the same experience in other directions and so turn hopefully to new experience. Failure to achieve full satisfaction owing to any of the manifold reasons which may intervene between III and IV results in doubt and anxiety in face of new experience.

If III and IV develop satisfactorily, the child progresses. He has a feeling of security and has an oncoming and adventurous attitude to life. If the object producing the pleasure be removed before this point is reached, resentment is aroused and in some natures can even lead to a refusal to accept the pleasures again when it is acceptable.

How long is occupied by IV depends on inherent speed of reaction of the individual and his individual memory. It is therefore closely related to the I.Q. of the child and to its temperamental type.

Having satisfactorily experienced stage I, stage II now sets in. Stage II is an alliance of intellect and emotion – stage I has been occupied entirely with the delight of passive enjoyment of the experience itself and its spontaneous expression in action, smiling, crowing, clapping the hands, jumping etc.

When the acuteness of this experience has become dulled by repetition the intellect comes into play. The child begins to notice the elements which have composed his experience; he notices what happens, notices it again experimentally, he enjoys the second stage of A. pleasure which is the conscious realisation of the pleasure and the process by which it is brought about. He then thinks of a variation or change, brings about a variation, the 'house' falls down, the bricks shoot about the floorhe is struck by a new happening: he enjoys this happening and stage I appears again, but this time at a higher level of differentiation than before. The process then goes on and ultimately becomes that critical discrimination we call 'good taste'.

We now turn to the normal development of B. pleasures. Here a different mechanism operates. The primary origin is the impulse towards mastery: a striving to do something, to accomplish something, to walk, to mount stairs, to jump. It contains the following elements:

- a. Impulse
- b. Attack
- c. Success
- d. Satisfaction

This satisfaction then becomes the basis for the next attack. A curious and interesting point is that the intelligence does not become involved as in A. pleasures in discrimination of the elements of the previous experience. Intelligence in B. pleasures is directed towards experiment with the elements of the next attack: it is rarely retrospective. Intelligence in reference to A. pleasures is directed towards analysis of the previous experience. This quality it is which later determines the mutual distrust and contempt between individuals who demonstrate most clearly the qualities of the two types of pleasure, the aesthete and the athlete. Intelligence is an important factor in the experience of the aesthete as is the physical effort and adventure in the athlete. The pleasure of the aesthete is in discrimination; of the athlete in achievement. Normal development of B. pleasures depends at each point upon success in achievement. The degree of success necessary to continuance in search for B. pleasure varies with the temperament of the individual experiencing it. If the tasks offered are too hard, and adequate success is not achieved, development becomes arrested along this line, and the child does not develop further.

It is my experience that neurosis can develop equally with a starvation of either A. or B. pleasures, but that these are fundamentally different in type.

Normal growth involves an intimate blending of both A. and B. pleasure, in pleasure and achievement. The task of parent and teacher is to provide adequate material for the experience of A. pleasure and suitable tasks for the development of B. pleasures, so that both together form a suitable scaffolding for adequate emotional growth.

Refusal to allow the adequate amounts of A. pleasure tends to produce the following results.

- a. A stunting of emotional growth.
- b. A resentment which is projected on to the outside world. The puritan is nearly always a persecutor.
- c. Melancholy.
- d. Lack of aesthetic development in individual and community.

Let us consider each of these in turn.

a. Stunting of emotional growth.

The thesis that I am attempting to put forward is an evolutionary one. I do not myself believe that mature emotion (such for example as 'unselfish love') can come about except by passage through and thorough enjoyment of earlier stages of A. pleasure experience. If this be granted at all, it follows as a necessary consequence that failure to experience the earlier stages of passive emotion, precludes the possibility of the appearance of the later stages. It is pertinent here to consider Professor MacMurray's thesis that the majority of mankind suffer from infantility of emotional development.

b. Resentment and its projection

There is a strong impulse in all human beings towards enjoyment of the passive pleasures. Refusal to the self of this enjoyment necessitates a form of belief which represents these pleasures to the individual as undesirable. The maintenance of such an attitude throughout life demands a constant effort at circumscription of experience. To be consistently effective, this effort in the 'healthy' individual must be backed by intellectual effort, either that of creating for the self a new belief, or of accepting a belief presented from outside. Whichever be the mode of development it is difficult for this, once again in a 'healthy' individual, to remain entirely a personal matter. Every human being reasons from itself to the outside world, what is therefore undesirable for the individual must be in essence undesirable, that is undesirable for people other than the self.

The step from this position to active condemnation of corresponding forms of behaviour in the outside world is very small and is inevitable in all temperaments of active type. Refusal of permission to the self to experience certain forms of pleasure, becomes then the refusal

of permission also to those for whom the self is responsible to experience analogous forms of pleasure; and thus to condemnation of this type of experience as a whole.

Persecution in this sense is always carried out in the name of the highest good.

In the neurotic personality this philosophic condemnation is replaced by a sense of personal inferiority expressed as a sense of guilt. The individual feels its actual self to be bad, and so has less tendency to universalise its concepts.

c. Melancholy

A. pleasure is a normal demand of every infant: it would appear to be a normal component of every human being. The child with a healthy antenatal life and a reasonable birth experience arrives in the world with an expectant attitude. Any satisfactory repetition of A. pleasure leads it to expect a repetition of this same satisfaction. It is prepared to regard the world as a provider of this experience as a 'good' world.

Denial of the 'rightness' of this experience, however this denial may be brought about, turns this expectation of 'good' to doubt. The world is no longer a 'good' place, the self is no longer 'good' when it expects this kind of pleasure. Greyness clouds both aspects of life, the child becomes melancholy. It is hoped later to publish a detailed account of a case of infantile melancholy to illustrate this chain of events.

A world which does not any longer produce a sufficiency of A. pleasure and in which it is no longer right to desire this pleasure, is a world with the attributes of A. pleasure cut out of it. It cannot help but be a melancholy world, and the child that inhabits it cannot fail to show an absence of those characteristic marks of spontaneous enjoyment of A. pleasure which have been outlined earlier in this paper.

d. Lack of aesthetic development in individual and community

It is clear that condemnation of A. pleasure either in individual or community will result in failure also of the critical discriminative faculty concerning A. pleasures, which is an integral part of development of this element of the personality. The type of A. pleasure enjoyed either by individual or community will remain at a primitive level, and approximate more to a B. than an A. category.

Nowhere is this easier to be seen than in relation to food. In those civilisations such as our own, where emphasis is consistently laid upon the importance of B. rather than A. pleasure, A. pleasure in food is particularly condemned. Food becomes considered as a necessary condition of the survival of life, and is regarded from this angle only. Man is proudly said 'to eat to live and not to live to eat.' As a result there is no civilisation in which, as a general circumstance, food is more atrociously prepared than the British. Discrimination in food values regarded from an A. pleasure point of view is usually at the level where that which is put into the stomach is regarded from the view of accessibility only, plus the relative capacity of the various elements to remove the discomforts associated with too long an absence of material in the intestines.

On the other hand, in civilisations where emphasis is laid upon development of A. rather than B. pleasures, a high degree of discrimination and delicacy is reached in such a treatment of the act of eating as shall produce the widest variety and most subtle variation of A. pleasure.

Failure to allow adequate opportunity, on the other hand, for the development of B. pleasures results in:

1. A tendency to development of anxiety.
2. Failure in the development of initiative.
3. Adherence to the family and to parents.
4. The development of a sense of unreality.
5. Maladaptation to life, what has been called 'Verhältnisblödsinn' or phantasy making concerning the self and the outside world.

Let us consider these in turn.

1. Development of anxiety.

Development of B. pleasure means the creation of a continuity of experiences of achievement of the self vis à vis the universe. Adequate experience along these lines results in a sense of confidence vis à vis the outside world. The self has tested itself and found itself adequate.

Lack of adequate B. pleasure involves an absence of experience of the joy in achievements. Each challenge of the outside world is felt then, not as an opportunity, but as a threat. This is very easily seen in the difference of demeanour vis à vis new experience of children brought up in an adventurous, as against children brought up in a overprotected environment. The latter face a new experience with shrinking and terror, the former with joy and a sense of adventure.

2. Failure to develop initiative.

Where experience of B. pleasure has been adequate, the child has learned to know itself and its own powers: it has accumulated experience of the self in relation to outside challenge, and the 'self' has come to some extent to be, to itself, an entity. 'I am I' says the child, 'I can do things.' An inevitable corollary is the will to initiate new action, the desire to accumulate further examples of this kind of pleasure. The child, in other words, is independent and shows initiative.

The child, on the other hand, in whose experience B. pleasure has been signally lacking has no knowledge of itself as against the universe, no experience of the fact that achievement brings pleasures, no experience of the fact that the pleasure of achievement overbalances the pains of effort. He sees only the possibility of defeat, the pains of experiment; he has no knowledge of himself, he cannot adventure. He is, as we say, lacking in initiative.

3. Adhesion to the family.

From the parents comes the protection of the child from that effort which underlies the acquisition of B. pleasure. As a natural consequence of 2. Arises a shrinking from individual effort, a desire to return to the protection of the family circle, an adherence to the family pattern. Thus it is inevitable that in civilisations such as the British where great stress is laid upon the importance of B. pleasure a lessening of adherence to the family will result and particularly in those individuals showing a development of the adventurous and pioneer types of character. On the other hand in those civilisations, such as the French, where great emphasis is laid upon development of A. pleasure, the general organisation of society is on a family basis and the family authority over the individual is maintained through life.

4. Sense of unreality.

I have been very much struck in the study of individuals in whose lives opportunities for the experience of B. pleasures have been conspicuously absent, particularly during the years of adolescence, by the prevalence of a sense of unreality. These girls and boys have generally accumulated a somewhat unusual degree of A. pleasure: unusual, that is, for the anglo-saxon civilisation. But as has been pointed out above, it is B. pleasure, not A. pleasure that leads towards development of the sense of personality. A. pleasures are experienced by the single senses, or occasionally by two combined senses, the personality, as a whole, taking little part. Excess of A. pleasure, therefore, unbalanced by B., results inevitably in a failure of development to an adequate level, adequate, that is, to the chronological age of the child. Adaptations, therefore, come to be demanded by life of the child for which its personality development is not adequate. A sense of depersonalisation, of unreality of the self supervenes.

6. Maladaptation to Life

This characteristic is an inevitable development out of the previous one. Understanding of life is dependent upon experience of life. Every individual makes for himself a world that is the replica of his own experience of himself. The child, therefore, whose experience of himself is disintegrated, untested, makes for himself a world of the same nature. Shut into his own intense sensations he erects these into cardinal importance and develops a 'Princess' phantasy, a sense of omnipotence. His wishes stand to him for facts, his phantasies for a picture of fact: