

## **Pleasure and Freudian Theory**

### **By Margaret Lowenfeld**

Owing to a certain misunderstanding the title which this paper has originally borne is a little misleading. What I want to attempt is not an exposition of pleasure as it is conceived by Freud, but to set out certain theories about pleasure which study of children and consideration in regard to them of Freud's pleasure principle has given rise to.

Freud's work and formulations are the central factor in psycho-therapy and demand the most careful and detailed consideration from any person working at the study of disturbed human beings. It is difficult discussion of findings to know whether they are valued or not, and it is, therefore, in recognition of the profound importance of Freud's formulations that I am today venturing on an exposition of some theories and conclusions derived from the study of emotionally disturbed children in regard to the nature of pleasure and the place played by it in human development.

The theories I am describing are the result of a number of years of work of myself and my colleagues at the Institute of Child Psychology and, used in a pragmatic way, have yielded satisfactory results.

Freud postulates, as operating in the infant and child and in the neurotic throughout life, a pleasure principle to which is opposed what is called the reality principle. The individual grows through the interaction of these two. The place given to the concept of pleasure in psychoanalytic work was the inspiration of this examination.

The thesis which I wish tentatively to put before you today is that the word 'pleasure' as it is commonly employed covers at least two modes of experience essentially different but complimentary to each other; that examination of pleasure, as an experience, carried out by investigators, has proceeded on the basis that pleasure is a unitary experience and that results of investigation of one kind of pleasure are applicable to other forms. It is this which I wish to question and to suggest that pleasure is not unitary but at least dual.

The two forms of pleasure I wish to deal with today I propose to call A. pleasure and B. pleasure.

A Pleasures are the pleasures experienced in passive response to stimuli. It is this type of pleasure which has been extensively examined, for example, by Wohlgemuth. The feeling of pleasure in this form of experience is the result of

stimulation arising from a source external to the central self and applied to a definite and limited area of stimulation. Feelings of various kinds are aroused in relation to the stimulus, but the pleasure is felt in the area of stimulation.

This form of pleasure, therefore, is associated with the senses. You will remember that in Wohlgemuth's study the following forms of stimulation were used.

### **Tactile**

1. Badger-hair brush
2. Powder-puff
3. Velvet

### **Olfactory**

1. Vanillin
2. Heliotropin
3. Musk

### **Auditory**

1. Tuning-fork, C 256
2. Tuning-fork, E 320
3. Organ-pipe

### **Visual**

1. Coloured paper, most pleasant
2. Coloured paper, less pleasant

The feeling of pleasure here aroused is concerned with the stimulus and thoughts about the stimulation. That is to say, though the stimuli may be extremely varied in type, refined and delicate, the feeling of pleasure aroused by them remains simple in that the feeling of pleasure called into being is through the exercise of one, or at most two, senses.

An important characteristic of experience of this kind is that repetition tends to produce a feeling of satiation. Each individual can feel pleasure in response to a certain amount of given sense stimulation. There arises a point, however, varying for each individual, where repetition of the same stimulation ceases to arouse pleasure. For the feeling of pleasure to be continued the stimulation must be varied in quantity or quality, but eventually a point will be reached where that individual will be totally unable to

continue to feel pleasure from that stimulation. That is to say, for him in regard to this, satiation point has been reached.

This process is a universal human experience. Throughout history, periods of elegance and culture have been marked by swift changes of fashion in dress, food, behaviour and decoration, constant variation of stimulus being found necessary to bring about the same feelings of delight.

A pleasure is, therefore, direct in nature, receptive in character, and, for each given stimulus, limited in degree, the line or limitation varying with each individual.

A curious characteristic of A pleasure is that there is in it always an element of surprise. However often for example a chocolate has been eaten, the exact quality of the next bite is not known until the chocolate has actually been tasted.

A pleasure has the specific characteristic that none of the more differentiated functions of the personality are implicated in its production. Essential to the experience are neither emotion, intelligence nor impulsive tendencies, though in life they can and do come into action in pursuit of a stimulus object. It is this lack of relationship between the receptive experience and the deeper layers of the personality which I would suggest results in the effect of satiation and is itself the reason why the individual has so limited a capacity for continuing enjoyment.

Experience to excess of this form of pleasure leaves too large a part of the individual's total capacity unexercised for it to be able to satisfy more than a part of his total self.

Let us now consider B Pleasure:

It appears to me that there is a form of pleasure which is a constant and common human experience which is different from this type of pleasure both in origin and action. To this I suggest we give the name B pleasure.

B pleasures are those which arise in connection with effort, and to make Dr Wohlgemuth's investigation extensive, these should have been included as well.

To choose examples of such pleasures felt in mountaineering, in playing golf, in solving crossword puzzles, or in singing. A curious paradox is essential to B pleasure in that such activity often includes the experience of unpleasure or pain. This unpleasure or pain does not in any way cancel out the pleasure inherent in the experience, but in some way heightens it, so that the pain or unpleasure become an intimate part of the total experience. B pleasures are essentially complex. They result from actions rather than from perceptions, and the actions are initiated from within, rather than reactive to stimuli from without. In the procedures which result in the awakening of a feeling of B. pleasure, several functions of the personality are

simultaneously at work, co-operating towards a single end. The intellect is, for example, always to some extent involved, not, as in the case of A. pleasure, in the preliminaries only to the pleasure, but in the pleasure itself.

B. Pleasure has certain definite characteristics.

1. It arises in connection with and out of movement. Although B. pleasure can take an infinite number of forms, be mental rather than physical, and involve a small or large part of the personality, it is inseparably connected with action
2. Movement can be enjoyed for its own sake and Freudian psychology has recognised this in the term 'muscle emotion'. Pleasure of this kind is one of the first to appear, and in some people persists throughout life. Into this group falls the pleasure experienced by infants and small children in the use of their limbs and enjoyment of the simple act of running in some people persists into adult life, and of this same kind is the pleasure experienced in folk-dancing, and to some extent in ballroom dancing. In such activity the intellect takes little or no part, though there may be present other functions of the personality, such as enterprise, initiative and persistence.
3. When the intellect combined with the impulse driving towards movement, a second form of B. pleasure results. This is the delight felt in the carrying out of movements directed towards a definite end. The aim may be minute and fleeting, as in the banging of hammer pegs, or well defined, as in creative effort. Here the feeling of pleasure gained is compounded of the pleasures of movement for its own sake together with the pleasure experienced in winning or coming progressively nearer a designed goal.
4. There is a fourth type of experience which gives rise to B. pleasure. This is the kind of experience in which by initiative arising from within, chances are brought about in the outside world or in the self.

Let us take first those connected with changes in the self. This type of experience is a modification of the one already described, in that it is purposive, but the purpose in this case is directed towards the self, and the pleasure experienced is partly that of the effort itself, and partly arises out of the changes themselves. Such activities are, for example, physical training and singing. In each the individual constantly compares his experience with an imagined goal and enjoys his gradual approximation.

The second type is that form of pleasure which arises in connection with activities which effect alterations in the outside world. Whether the results be ugly or beautiful, table-mats for one's aunt or the building of a Town Hall, the result is the same: The individual has produced an effect upon matter outside itself, and has

experience pleased in the process. That is to say, the activity in question was undertaken, not for its reflect effect upon the self, but in relation to something or someone outside the self.

It is not in any way necessary that group B. pleasures should be of a 'higher' type from Group B. pleasures should be of a 'higher' type than group A. pleasures. It is possible for group B. pleasures to be singularly vile as in the pleasures of cruelty. What is essential is a sense of power over the self or the environment. However small, fragmentary or illusory it may be, this sense of power is an inalienable element in all B. pleasures and has no relation to the value or the skill, the success of the failure, the beauty or the ugliness of the effect the individual brings to pass. It was Madame Montessori who first perceived the existence of B. pleasure in the child, and its fundamental importance for its growth. Where other educations had taken for granted that children would resist education and had concentration upon forms of discipline to enforce its acquisition, Madame Montessori put forward the bold statement that, given right material and right atmosphere, children would actually enjoy the process of education, and would even educate themselves. Experience has triumphantly proved her right. B. pleasure is the basis of the Montessori system and the study of a child at work with the Montessori apparatus gives a fascinating demonstration of the interaction of A. and B. pleasure, and of the vividness of the pleasure experienced by children in the manipulation of her material. While repetition of A. pleasure dulls its edge and leads eventually to satiation, a satisfactory experience of B. pleasure whets the appetite for more. While the range of pleasure inherent in response to a particular form of A. pleasure is relatively small, there is no limit to the amount of degree of B. pleasure which can arise from a suitable activity. The smallest success, for example, in a game of golf, stimulates a desire to return to the attempt, and it is doubtful if even a world championship game entirely exhausts the game's pleasure-giving possibilities to the player.

Another fundamental element in group B. pleasures lies in the fact that there is in them a particle of eternity. Every individual tends to be burdened with a sense of the fleetingness of itself and time, and with the sense that his words, his actions and his feelings all pass away and leave nothing behind. There are few things to intolerable to the human mind as the feeling that it itself is nothing, a thing of no weight, and of no importance. The completion, therefore, of the smallest piece of work – a pretty cushion-cover for one's friend, or a model ship for one's son – produces in the maker a feeling of having defeated this impermanence. Something has been created that will remain, even if this permanence is transitory.

The human psyche is perpetually beset by two irresistible and unquenchable pains. Firstly, the pain of inadequacy, felt far more acutely in childhood than in later life, and in modern times more than if we had lived in earlier and simpler days. Secondly, the pain of impermanence itself, friends, family, school and nation – the feeling that these may pass away and nothing remain.

A. Pleasures are related to both these pains, and, if adequately experienced, they definitely assuage the distress they cause. B. pleasures have reference, therefore, to some of the profoundest elements of the human psyche.

A. Type of pleasure is related only to the moment of time in which it occurs, and to that stage of the development at which the individual finds himself in the moment of experiencing it. It leaves no trace behind, and when it has gone forever.

Adult persons much addicted to A. pleasures, therefore, tend to age early, to lose their pristine energy with which they started on their type of career, to become blasé and tired, and to sink quickly under the attacks of adverse circumstances. Emphasis upon A. pleasure and concentration of the forces upon the acquisition of it results in a stunting of other parts of the personality which, denied exercise, remain undeveloped. On the other hand, B. pleasures ricochet back upon the total personality, assuaging some of its deepest pains, and gaining new life and new vigour, therefore. People whose lives are mainly concerned with pleasures of this type seem to draw from some strange hidden source springs of energy that carry them over mountains of labour without apparent damage to their machinery. Yet this also has its disadvantages. Exclusive concentration upon effort narrows perception, and consequences follow in some ways almost as disastrous to the personality as follow exclusive concentrations upon A. pleasures and which will be taken up in a later part of this paper.

Let us, therefore, make out a balance sheet of these two types of pleasure.

A. Pleasures	B. Pleasures
1. Simple, the exercise of one or two sensations	Complex, a combination of a number of forces in the individual
2. Passive and receptive	Outgoing, an exercise of function
3. Reaction to external stimuli	Product of internal stimuli
4. Arises from sensations in physical self, leaving external world untouched	Brings about changes in external world
5. Limited	Unlimited
6. Demands progressively stronger stimulation	Demands progressively less stimulation
7. Leads to satiation	Leads to repetition
8. Increases dissociation between sense and intellect	Integrates sense and cognition

9. Has no relation to the deeper layers of the personality	Assuages some of the deeper human needs.
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There needs now to be considered the relation of A. and B. pleasures to the emotions.

Although A. pleasures are those of the senses, they are not limited to the special sense but arise also from skin, mucous membrane and those specially sensitised portions of the skin and mucous membrane surface, the clitoris and the glans penis.

In pure A. pleasure – such as, for example, that experienced in sub-bathing – the emotions take little part.

Where stimulation of these surfaces results in discharge of emotional tension this is brought about either by the fantasies which accompany the stimulation of these areas or through movements which, though initiated by stimulation of these areas, are yet separated from them.

The connection, however, between B. pleasure and emotion is different. The activities which bring about B. pleasure form appropriate channels for the discharge of many of the major emotions, such as aggression, in the use of hammer pegs and in ball games, power in carpentry and dominance in mountain climbing.

Let us now consider the evolution in the human being of these forms of pleasure.

### **A. Pleasures.**

Study of children during the process of growth suggests that the process of development of A pleasure takes something like the following route.

#### **Stage I.**

- Part 1. Memory of a previous A. pleasure leads to expectation of its renewal. (It is possible that prenatal experience is the original A pleasure experience leading after birth to an expectation of the renewal of this experience, and Dr. Jane Suttie's thesis is suggestive in this connection.
- Part 2. Movement towards the achievement of renewal.
- Part 3. Fresh realisation of A pleasure.

- Part 4. Repetition of the performance producing this pleasure until all the newness is worn off: e.g. to **saturation** point as far as this particular experience is concerned.

## **Stage II.**

- Part 1. Relinquishment of the process producing the pleasure.
- Part 2. Examination of the surroundings in so far as much is possible, in order to find a fresh source of pleasure . . . If opportunity for enjoyment of the pleasure provided but the first found form of stimulation is not adequate from saturation point to be reached, the process will not develop beyond this point, and the child needs to remain attached to this early form. If enough opportunity be present, the child will drop that form of pleasure and be ready to respond to one slightly more differentiated. Having achieved this, the same process will be carried out.

Experience of satisfaction in one direction tends to make the child expect the same experience in other directions and so to turn hopefully to new experience. Failure to reach saturation point owing to any of the manifold reasons which may intervene between 3 and 4 tends to result in doubt and anxiety in face of new experience.

If 3 and 4 develop satisfactorily, the child progresses; he has a feeling of security and has an oncoming and adventurous attitude towards life.

If the object producing the pleasure is removed before this point is reached, resentment is aroused, and in some natures can even lead to a refusal to accept the pleasure again when it is available.

How long is occupied by 4 depends upon inherent speed of reaction of the individual and the nature of his individual memory. It is, therefore closely related to the I.Q. of the child, and to its temperamental type.

In slightly older children the following can be noted. Stage I has been occupied entirely with the delight of passive enjoyment of the experience itself and its spontaneous expression in action – smiling, laughing, clapping the hands, jumping, etc.

When the acuteness of this experience has become dulled by repetition, the intellect comes into play.

Stage II is an alliance of intellect and emotion. The child begins to notice the elements which have composed his experience; he watches what happens, tries it

again experimentally, and he enjoys the second stage of A. pleasure which is the conscious realisation of the pleasure and the process by which it is brought about. He then thinks of a variation of change, seeks, or brings about a variation . . . he is struck by a new happening he enjoys this happening, and Stage I appears again – but this time at a higher level of differentiation than before. The process then goes on and in the mature individual ultimately becomes that critical discrimination which we call ‘good taste’.

In the normal development of B. pleasures, a different mechanism operates. The primary origin, let us say, is the impulse towards mastery: a striving towards mastery: a striving to do something, to accomplish something, to walk, to mount stairs, to jump. This striving contains the following elements:-

- a. Impulse
- b. Attack
- c. Success
- d. Satisfaction

This satisfaction then becomes the basis for the next attack. A curious and interesting point is that the intelligence does not appear to be involved, as in A pleasure, in discrimination of the elements of the **next attack**, it is nearly retrospective. Intelligence in reference to A pleasures is directed towards analysis of the **previous** experience.

This difference in quality it seems to be which later determines the mutual distrust and contempt between individuals who demonstrate most clearly the two types of pleasure, for example, the aesthete and the athlete. Intelligence is an important factor in the experience of the aesthete, but physical effort and adventure are what count with the athlete. The pleasure of the aesthete is in discrimination; the pleasure of the athlete in achievement.

The normal development of B pleasures depends at each point upon success in achievement, and the degree of success necessary to continuance in search of B pleasure varies with the temperament of the individual experiencing it. If the tasks offered are too hard, and adequate success is not achieved development along this line becomes arrested.

How, then, do these principles work in normal growth? In my experience, normal growth involves an intimate blending of both A and B pleasures, and success in development depends on an adequate supply of both. There are certain definite results which can be seen as following upon failure of the child’s environment to permit adequate experience of both A and B pleasure, and I would like here to have adduced case material to illustrate the points I wish to bring out. Consideration, however, of suitable cases, showed very quickly that to bring forward enough material from any

case to be convincing, more time would be necessary than could conceivably be consumed by such a paper, and it has had, therefore, to be omitted.

Let us now turn our attention to the consequences of too little or too ample opportunity for the experience of these two forms of pleasures.

## **A Pleasure**

Inadequate opportunity for enjoyment of A pleasure appears to bring about four consequences.

The first concerns the development of primitive emotion, and particularly that of love. Sensory stimulation coming from mother to infant is an essential part of the process which induces in the infant a positive love emotion towards the mother. Absence of these necessary stimuli hampers the development of the emotion. Denied the necessary gratification and pleasure, the infant tries to supply there for himself by self-stimuli and then by hallucinatory pleasure. The formation of object relationship is definitely hindered.

In later life the same mechanism holds, and lack of adequate sensory stimulation in woman results in many cases in failure to achieve a normal sex relationship.

The second result which may follow is melancholy and the development of a sense of resentment with, later, the tendency to project this on the outer world.

Since A. pleasure is a normal demand of every infant and would appear to be a normal component of every human being, the child with a health ante-natal life and a reasonable birth experience arrives in the world with an expectant attitude. Any satisfactory experience of A. pleasure leads it to expect a repetition of the same satisfaction. It is prepared to regard the world as a provider of this experience.

Denial of the 'rightness' of this experience, however this denial may be brought about, turns this expectation of 'good' to doubt. The world is no longer 'good' place, the self is no longer 'good' when it expects this kind of pleasure. Greyness clouds both aspects of life, and the child tends to become melancholy.

A world which does not any longer produce a sufficiency of A. pleasure, and in which it is no longer right to desire this pleasure is a world with the attributes of A. pleasure cut out of it.

It cannot help but be a melancholy world, and the child that inhabits it cannot fail to show an absence of the characteristic marks of spontaneous enjoyment of A. pleasure which have been outlined earlier in this paper.

Direct denial for the experience of A. pleasure is felt by the child as a condemnation of it. This condemnation coming into conflict with the child's natural appetites for A. pleasure leads to the arousal of resentment in the child. The most direct form of expression of this resentment is in rebellion. This may not take place, however, and the individual may instead come to adopt this same attitude – i.e. to refuse the opportunity for A. pleasure to the self.

The maintenance of such an attitude throughout life demands a constant effort to achieve the circumscription of experience. To be constantly effective, this effort, in the healthy individual must be backed by intellectual effort, either that of creating for the self a systemised belief which represents these as bad, or the acceptance of a belief presented from outside. Whichever be presented, it is difficult for it to remain a personal matter. Every human being reasons from himself to the outside world. What is therefore 'bad' for the individual must in essence be 'bad' that is, bad for people other than the self.

The step from this position to actual condemnation of corresponding forms of behaviour in the outside world is very small and is inevitable in temperament of an active type.

### **Lack of Aesthetic Development in Individual and Community.**

It is clear that condemnation of A. pleasure in either individual or community will result in failure also of the critical discriminative faculty concerning A. pleasure, which is an integral part of aesthetic development. The type of A. pleasure enjoyed either by individual or community will therefore tend to remain at a relatively primitive level, and approximate more to an A. than to a B. category.

As an illustration take the ordinary English attitude towards food. In large sections of our society it is usual for emphasis to be laid upon A. rather than upon B. pleasures, and A. pleasure in food is particularly condemned. Food becomes considered as a necessary condition of the survival of life and is regarded from this angle only. Man is proudly said to 'eat to live' and not to 'live to eat'. As a result, there is no country in which, in general, circumstances, food is more atrociously prepared than in Great Britain. Discrimination between different kinds of food is guided by convenience or by their relative power to relieve the natural cravings of the stomach.

On the other hand, in societies where emphasis is laid upon development of A. rather than of B. pleasures, the art of eating is cultivated to the highest degree, and produces, as a result, wide and subtle variations of food.

Over development, on the other hand, of A. pleasure results in:-

### **(a) Formation of a habit of gratification**

Lacking the experience of the pleasures of achievement and feeling inadequate to life, the individual relies more and more upon the satisfaction of A. pleasure and ultimately can become entirely dependent on it.

### **(b) A passive attitude to life**

A. pleasures are pleasures of receptivity. Effort mars them. Overindulgence in A. pleasure results in a spreading of the essential passivity of the experience over on to the general attitude with a passive acceptance of the circumstances of life, and sometime a sinking into illness. If an A. pleasure gain comes to be associated with the illness the habit tends to become fixed, and the child appears to prefer the discomforts of illness rather than undertake the discomforts of effort incidental to recovery of health.

### **(c) Inadequacy vis a vis life and the retention of an undeveloped personality**

As has already been described, in enjoyment of A. pleasure only the simplest parts of the personality are involved. Undue emphasis, therefore, on A. pleasure leaves the deeper layers of the personality untouched, and the personality tends to remain infantile.

Inadequate opportunities for development of B. pleasures, on the other hand, tends to be associated with the following results.

### **1. Development of anxiety**

I have been interested in children that lack adequate B. pleasure involves an absence of the experience of the joy in achievements. Every challenge to the outside world is felt then, not as an opportunity but as a threat. This is easily seen in the difference of demeanour between children brought in secure, but adventurous surroundings, and those who have been over protected. The first type face a new experience with joy and a sense of adventure, while the second think with terror of a new experience.

Development of B. pleasure means a continuity of experience of achievement of the self vis a vis the universe.

Adequate experience along these lines results in a sense of adventure vis a vis the outside world. The self has tested itself and found itself adequate.

Lack of this experience tends to induce fear when the child is confronted with a new experience. . . Missing the experience of success, he finds success hard to imagine.

Associated with this is a:

## **2. Failure to develop initiative.**

Where experience of B. pleasure has been adequate the child comes to learn to know itself and its own powers. It has accumulated experience of the self in relation to outside challenge and the 'self' to some extent has come to be to itself an entity. "I am I" says the child, meaning "I can do things". An inevitable corollary to this achievement is the will to initiate new action. The child, in other words, becomes independent and shows initiative.

The child whose experience of B. pleasure has been lacking has little knowledge of itself as against the universe, no experience of the fact that achievement outbalances the pain of effort. He sees only the possibility of defeat, the pains of experiment, and fails in either the desire or the power to initiate activity.

Finally, such a child tends to show undue:

## **3. Adhesion to the family.**

Parents tend to protect the child from the effort which must underlies the experience of B. pleasure. As a natural consequences of lack of such experience there arises a desire to be protected from effort and risk and to return to the protection of the family circle. Thus, in societies such as ours, where stress is laid upon the importance of B. pleasure, a lessening of adherence to the family tends to result, and to be particularly evident in individuals who show a development of the adventurous and pioneer type of character. On the other hand, in a nation like the French, where great emphasis is laid upon the development of the A. pleasure, the general organisation of society tends to be on a family basis, and the family authority over the individual to be maintained though life.

Out of this lack of experience of the pleasure of achievement there develops a poor.

#### **4. Sense of reality**

I have been much struck when studying individuals in whose life's opportunities for the experience of B pleasures have been conspicuously absent, particularly during adolescence, by the prevalence of a sense of unreality. These girls and boys have generally accumulated, for English people, a somewhat unusual degree of A pleasure experience. But it is B pleasure, not A pleasure, that leads towards development of the sense of personality. Excess of A pleasures, therefore, unbalanced by B results in a failure of development of the personality, adequate to the chronological of the child by life, for which its personality development is not adequate. A sense of unreality, supervenes.

As a result, the child shows:

#### **5. Maladaptation to Life**

Understanding of life is dependent upon experience of life. Every individual makes a world for himself that is the replica of his own experience. The child, therefore, whose experience of himself is disintegrated and untested, makes for himself a world of the same nature. Shut into his own intense sensations, he erects these into cardinal importance and develops a 'Princess' phantasy, a sense omnipotence. His wishes stand for him as facts, his phantasies for a picture of fact.

Overdevelopment of B pleasures, on the other hand, results in:-

##### **1. An obsessional devotion to work**

Every individual, as Freud has shown, craves pleasure. Over-experience of B pleasure combined with inadequate experience of A leads to a heavy over-valuation of B pleasure. These being the only pleasures the individual knows. A tendency appears towards an obsessional seeking of B pleasures and overmastering drive towards work.

With this there goes:-

##### **2. Emotional coldness and lack of sympathy with other human beings**

The essential character of B pleasure is that it is experienced in relation to external objects, to things rather than to people. An excess of B pleasure, therefore, gives knowledge only of the relationship of the self to outside **objects**, not to other human beings. Sympathy with others is a direct outcome of similar experience. The suffering of others, therefore, in relation to their fellows, or to themselves, tends to be regarded with indifference or even contempt. Only the relations between humans and objects are understood. If the objects in connection with which the experience of B

pleasure has been gained, are subordinate human beings, the result to even worse. Such a type of individual tends inevitably to become a slave-driver or a tyrant.

Associated with these there is

### **3. Intolerance of outlook**

We have already considered the relation of lack of A pleasure to persecution. Emphasis is laid upon B pleasure to the exclusion of A results in an over-valuation of effort and a contempt for the accessories of sensory experience. Such a development brings about inevitably a general impoverishment of the aesthetic sense, whether in the individual or in the community, and leads, for example, to situations like the relation of Cromwell to beauty in architecture.

Finally, there may result a nervous breakdown.

### **4. Nervous breakdown**

B pleasure tends to make the machinery of effort whirl faster and faster until the very movement becomes an end in itself. Then there results a curious inability to appreciate the nature of reality, but in a way different to that which is related to A pleasure. Here the ultimate good of the whole universe comes to be felt as centred in and dependent upon the work of the particular individual. As the distance between this concept and reality becomes greater, the inevitable price of all distortion is paid, and the individual 'breaks down'. Nature, defrauded by concentration upon work and B pleasure, of its essential A pleasures, now ceases to allow indulgence in B pleasures either.

As Freud has pointed, the individual seeks pleasure as the boy seeks air, and endeavours to turn from that which is not pleasurable. Normal life seems to consist of a definite rhythm between these two experiences of A and B pleasure where pleasure leading towards initiation of A into B. As when contemplation of attractively coloured drawing initiates the effort to copy it. Success in the copying brings about pleasure in the contemplation. This suggests a basis for further effort and if successful gives rise once again, in the child, to experience of A pleasure.

In discussing these pleasures and endeavouring to trace their action, one point is of great importance. Although in the text illustrations have been drawn from the life of societies of the experience of adult human beings, this has been done to facilitate explanation of the thesis and because of the ready accessibility of this material to every adult hearer. Common individual experience here illustrates this thesis. But through broad outlines of the working out of this principle in adult life can be seen, there is at this stage of our knowledge not enough evidence available to know more than the simplest outlines.

With children the case is different and careful observation of any group of children will readily show these two principles and their interaction. A normal personality needs both in order to grow. Absolute denial of either is impossible, but severe deprivation of both A and B pleasures leads to a turning away from reality and an absorption of the psyche in the interior life. Owing to the operation of the primary system in this inner life, the divorce between the interior experience and the outside world grows gradually wider until phenomenon resembling psychosis are produced.

It is not necessary for A and B pleasure to be experienced separately experiences. Many experiences combine elements of both such pleasures, take for example the activity of smoking. Here the B pleasure of effort is combined with the complex A pleasure of the mother's proximity, and warmth and sweetness of milk within the mouth. In the working out of this experience there are possibilities for full development of this experience there are possibilities for full development for each pleasure.

Delight in the sensations experienced in lips, mouth and tongue leads the baby to use these areas as his experimenting instruments in gaining knowledge of life. Everything he touches goes into his mouth; the sensations produced are compared with those already known. In some people this delight persists in adult life the pleasure of chocolate and cigarettes.

What then is the relation between pleasure as it is decided here, and the pleasure principle? Freud postulates a basic striving for pleasure form which the child gradually turns to adapt itself to reality. Reality is therefore conceived of as opposed to pleasure, and treatment of the neurotic slowly brings him to turn from absorption in the pleasure principle, to adaptation to reality. The phenomena to which this description applies are familiar to all of you whose work lies with neurotic children or adults. With the reality of the phenomena there is no question. The problem lies in the description.

In the sense used by Freud, reality arises only two common agreement of the persons of the society among whom the individual lives as to the right nature and conduct of man. It has no relation to the reality of the philosophers. In this use of the word there is a different real type of example for a neurotic member of a tribe of things from that of a neurotic person.

We are all familiar with the neurotic's absorption in a world which is at variance with the facts among which he lives and recognise that much of his behaviour is in a reality a clinging to satisfactions which have become inappropriate. But to use the word pleasure principle for this phenomenon as opposed to a reality principle is to suggest that this experience termed 'pleasure' belongs to the infantile part and is absent from any other part of the personality. When the misery of the neurotic is considered and

related to the relative peace and content of the well-adjusted individual the pleasure principle gives one a sense of inadequacy and discomfort. . . That the experience of adjustment to reality brings with it a keen pleasure is the experience of everyone, and in a true description of human experience a room must be made for this fact. We cannot except the suggestion that reality is opposed to pleasure. Reality contains pleasure.

Could it not then be that in this series of phenomena with which we are all familiar, the **whole** process is in some way related to pleasure? But the pleasures experienced in one portion of the personality or at one period of life are different in quality and kind from those experienced at a different time and in a different portion of the personality, and that's the difference, surely, the fundamental opposition lies.

It is with great difference that I put forward this suggestion. Work with children has made it quite clear to me that pleasure is associated with all stages of a child's development and that the experiences through which a neurotic child moves towards health increasing rather than diminishing his experience of pleasure. . In this identification of pleasure with the earlier and less admirable forms of experience, Freud has passed into a strange moralism. There is a hint of either the Judaic or the Puritan morality that would oppose 'Pleasure', and 'Goodness' and that would deny to reality its pleasurable content.

Surely this is a wrong conception of reality, and, to some extent, a mischievous one? The pleasures of early experience are dominating and hold a powerful influence over parts of the personality. But is this not due to the qualities we have been considering under A pleasure? No effort is contained in this experience – satisfaction of appetite is direct and immediate.

What is hard, and what is someone's task to persuade the neurotic to undertake, is to move from the simple direct and immediate satisfaction of the primary systems, which are easy and to hand, and proceed, without previous experience of the B. type of pleasure, to the adventure of B. pleasure experience. I protest most emphatically against the theses that there is any less pleasure in reality than in primary experience. The pleasures of reality are keen and exquisite, and it is the task of the physician and the educator to win children or the child in the adult individual to give up the early relatively unsatisfactory pleasures of primary experience for the complicated, subtle, effort-containing pleasures of reality.

To sum up, therefore, I would suggest that

1. Pleasure cannot be considered as a single experience but is separable into two elements.
2. These two elements I propose to call A and B pleasures.

3. While A and B pleasures interact with each other, they are fundamentally opposed in nature and development.
4. There is a characteristic form of development associated with each type of pleasure.
5. Both over-emphasis and under-emphasis on each form leads to the development of definite and recognisable characteristics of a morbid type.
6. That normal development and normal life involve and demand an alternating rhythm of A and B pleasures.
7. Mastery of 'reality' and adaptation to the external world involve as keen a pleasure as that of primitive experience.
8. That the opposition Pleasure Principle, Reality Principle, is a false antithesis.
9. That the terms Pleasure Principle, and Reality Principle in Freud's formulations do not describe accurately the phenomena involved, but that the passage from neurosis to health is the substitution of pleasures appropriate to the individual and his circumstances for pleasures that are fantastic and inappropriate.